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This paper is focused on finding a policy approach that quickly facilitates and stimulates future 
growth, and thus goes well beyond austerity. Increasingly, as economic performance has deteriorat-
ed in most European countries, EU public opinion and leaders have begun to stress with increased 
urgency the need for far greater emphasis on growth.  Meaningful actions on a sufficient scale have 
however not yet been taken.  
 
In this paper we aim to make specific proposals on how one key and successful EU institution, the 
European Investment Bank, (EIB) can expand its lending significantly, in ways that will make a mean-
ingful contribution to growth, particularly in the countries, whose economies and citizens have suf-
fered most from the sovereign debt crisis; we will also examine the role which EU Structural Funds 
can both on their own, and especially as a complement to EIB lending, further contribute to EU 
growth. After outlining in some detail the type of measures that can be taken, as well as their scale, 
we model the likely impact on GDP and employment, which would be significant. One important 
advantage of our approach is that with fairly limited public resources, it can achieve a very large im-
pact, due to the benefits of leverage. 
 
 
1. Policy Context 
 
 
There is growing consensus that it will prove impossible to lead the EU out of crisis without stimulat-
ing sustainable growth. For example the recent downgrading of Spain is already mainly driven by the 
lack of growth perspectives in the near future. A downward spiral for banks, enterprises and con-
sumers needs to be urgently avoided. A widespread resolution of the sovereign debt crisis will only 
succeed with a significant growth impulse. To ignore this is not only bad arithmetic and worse eco-
nomics, but also ignores the clear lessons of history. 
 There is the need for an additional growth-promoting financing strategy which: 
- produces rapid and significant effects; 
 -enhances productive capacity, encouraging present and future sustainable growth by financing 
economically sustainable projects and activities; 
- supporting the growth of both existing and new competitive small and medium sized enterprises. 
Particularly these enterprises are suffering severe lack of access to private credit, which has been 
stagnating during the crisis or, worse still, declining. 
 
There is the need for a proposal that is not only desirable but also feasible. A sound initiative, which 
has real chances of success, therefore needs to be: 
- Feasible to implement quickly. Time is short; every day 4000 additional Spanish citizens are entering 
unemployment. 
- Have sufficient size to make a meaningful contribution, to help kick start growth and reduce unem-
ployment; 
- Be cost effective in terms of large impact with relatively limited additional public resources; the 
measures we propose provide significant leverage 
 
The historical experience of the Marshall Plan after World War II can serve as a valuable reference 
concerning the proper size of such a program. The plan for Europe consisted of a total of $13-14 bil-
lion in currency of that period.. That represented yearly additional investment of about 0.5% of Eu-
ropean GDP, over about 5 years, altogether about 2.5% of GDP. A similar order of magnitude would 





2. The Dimension of the EU-budget 
 
 
The EU budget approximately equals to 1% of European GDP annually. To generate a significant 
growth impulse, it is important to use the EU budget in an effective way, which maximizes its impact 
via leverage. Increased lending by the EIB, as well as project bonds, are ideal instruments for these 
aims, as is increasingly recognized. A key challenge is to deploy such instruments on a meaningful 
scale and do that rapidly, as it is so urgent to re-start growth, as well as to channel them towards 
efficient investment. 
 
Regarding the dimension, our proposal would involve additional budgetary resources that represent 
only a very small proportion of the total EU budget allocated to growth; however, as we will show 
the impact on growth would be very large, given the multiplier effects provided by leverage.  
The European Commission plans expenditure of €1000 billion for the seven years from 2014 to 2020, 
of which 38% are assigned to structural funds, 9% to employment and social matters and 8% to re-
search and innovation. (see Figure 1).   
 












3. Additional resources; use of EU-structural funds which were not drawn down 
 
 
Structural funds provide between two to three percent of GDP to regions with developmental defi-
cits. The draw-down of these funds has been especially difficult since 2007, being slowed down by 
the crisis. For that reason, a big sum of pledged, but not drawn down, funds will be available in 2012 
and 2013 (including final down payments until 2015). For the time being some 25 % of the Regional 
Funds are not even allocated. Even more important, not all the volumes being allocated will be 
drawn down because of delays and difficulties linked to the crisis. In the framework of an immediate 
program to recover growth, the task ought to be to rededicate these funds and channel them for 
activities for growth. It has been estimated that up to € 80 billion are available for such re-use. To 
achieve this task, more flexibility by national and European administrations is required. What is also 
needed is targeted regrouping of funds into economically viable projects, especially “shovel ready” 
ones in areas such as: 
- energy efficiency and renewable energy; 
- promoting competitive, preferably  export-oriented enterprises 
-  financing of small and medium sized enterprises that are credit rationed; 
-  financing of innovation in enterprises and enterprise spin-offs. 
 
The re-channeling of available resources should be designed to not just provide funds, but combined 
with technical support to assure the appropriate draw-down of funds. This technical support should 
include help with preparation of application documents, support with bidding processes and project 
management during implementation. 
 
 
4. Dimensions of an immediate program from the EU-budget 
 
 
If a concerted effort is made using re-channeling, €15 billion annually can be easily pooled from the 
existing European budgets (until the end of 2013) for direct use in such a growth initiative in an im-
mediate program.  This volume could be raised from the new budget for the period 2014 to 2020 to 
about €25 billion per year.  
 
Looking at the special case of Greece, it becomes immediately clear that we are talking about a long-
term economic reconstruction process, which will require persistence. Even the maximum value of 
€25 billion from the EU budget represents merely 0.25% of EU GDP. It will be possible to apply a 
higher percentage to countries with economic adjustment programs and lower ones in countries, 
which can achieve growth on their own. For that reason, a corridor, between 0.5% of GDP at a maxi-
mum and 0.125% of GDP at a minimum suggests itself. However, even growth-projects in stronger 
countries will generate positive effects for growth in all of Europe.    
 
This investment volume must be complemented with money from other sources, including national 
and private ones, and be increased as much as possible by its multiplier effect. However, it will not 









5. Achieving leverage effects with the EU-budget 
 
 
Achieving leverage with the EU budget is in effect the easiest and most promising path to put the 
European Investment Bank to a better use.  
 
The basic mechanism is to use a part of the EU-budget as a risk buffer. Thereby EIB-loans for projects 
become less risky, which permits either higher volumes or lower interest rates, sometimes facilitating 
otherwise impossible financing. The leverage effect with the most mature product (innovation) was 
projected to be five, thereby having one billion Euros from the EU-budget facilitating 5 billion Euro of 
credit in innovation.  De facto, a factor of six was realized via the EIB, actually a bit better than 
planned. As losses were considerably below prudent forecasts, most of the one billion Euro were not 
used, but instead returned to the EU-budget. 
 
Thus, in this area empirically verifiable experiences exist. Examples are in the financing of innovation 
(RSSF) and in regional financing (JESSICA, JEREMIE) EIB schemes. The recently signed initiative for 
SME’s in Greece is likewise similar. The planned EU-project bonds, which do not represent EU-
borrowing, but instead expand EIB-activities, also veer in this direction. 
 
 
6. EU-project bonds and the EIB 
 
 
According to the project bonds proposal, large projects could be co-financed by the EIB alongside 
with private capital from pension funds and insurance companies that currently do not fund large 
investment projects, due to too high risks. Before the financial crisis, these risks were absorbed by 
large mono-line insurers (such as AIG), with the help of which the financing of such projects were 
transformed into triple-A bonds. After the crisis, this insurance is no longer available.  
 
The project-bonds would work in similar ways.  Private investors would advance 25% in equity. The 
EIB would finance the next 25% as mezzanine tranches. The final 50% (senior tranches) would hope-
fully reach a rating of BBB+ or A-, thereby becoming an allowed investment class for pension funds 
and insurance companies. Regarding the mezzanine tranche, the EU would absorb half of the risk 
using the risk buffer, which is liable for first losses.  
 
The EIB remains a part of financing for the entire time of the project, thereby adding an additional 
element of quality for the insurers and pension funds. 
 
The risk of financing for the EIB is thereby reduced- compared to the risk if the EIB were to do it all on 
its own. If the EIB receives this risk buffer, it can lend up to four times the amount of low-risk loans as 
compared to independently realized projects.   
 
If one wanted to reach, for example, a loan volume of €160 billion in four years, and € 40 billion per 
year, this corresponds to additional EIB financing activity of €10 billion per year, and €40 billion for 
the four year period. To finance the €40 billion from the EIB (25% of 160 billion) for four years, €20 







7. Increasing the equity of the EIB 
 
 
If the EIB is to play an even more active role in the framework of a large-sized growth program, the 
injection of new money will be necessary - which may not be possible for all EU-member states.  
 
Why is that the case? In the past, paid-in equity injections from member-countries were financed by 
the cumulative profits of the EIB. Of the officially subscribed equity of the bank of € 232.4 billion, 
only € 11.6 billion are actually paid-in. In addition to these sources, the EIB, during all the years of 
crisis has managed its financing activities well, increasing its annual profits from € 1.4 billion to €2.3 
billion most recently. Thanks to retained profits of decades additional equity of € 42.5 billion has 
been generated, increasing the robustness of the EIB and its capacity to bear risks. 
 
Rating agencies require now a simple leverage ratio of eight to be also applied to the EIB, in the same 
way as applied to private banks.     
 
If paid-in equity of the EIB is doubled, paid-in capital would only have to increase by around €12 bil-
lion. This, given a leverage of eight, (which is high in comparison to other instruments) would gener-
ate an ability for the EIB to increase loans by around €95 billion in total during the next few years. If 
the loan increase is distributed over four years, it could for example lead to increased lending of € 10 
billion during 2012 , to €35 billion  lending growth in  2013, and to €25 billion  annually in 2014 and 
2015(all these figures are for  lending  above that  which would have happened without the capital 
increase). 
 
Thus a leverage ratio of “only” eight represents a notable multiplier effect and better than what can 
be achieved with EU-budgetary means, where the effect resides between four and six. The focal 
point of financing activity, as always with the EIB, will be economically viable projects. Such an ear-
marked capital injection could be dedicated especially to targets of focused pro –growth and em-
ployment   policies, from the financing of innovation, to the promotion of SMEs, to economic land-
mark projects, such as a cable connection from the most suitable European locations for solar energy 
production in Crete to the mainland, an investment which is economically viable but finds no financi-
ers.  
 
Doubling equity will be possible, if EU member governments that wish to do so, (unanimity is not 
required) inject a relatively small amount of paid –in capital, of around   € 12 billion. Compared to the 
massive sums injected to save the private banks, this is a fairly small amount, with a huge multiplier 
effect on growth. 
 
It seems appropriate to emphasize the selectivity and earmarking for the equity increase of the EIB. 
For this reason, the money should be returned after 12 years through a special dividend payment 












8. Additional proposed EIB and EU growth program.  
 
 
In summary, two additional effects can be obtained with the help of the EIB. One is based on a selec-
tive, earmarked equity increase of around € 12 billion from member countries willing and able to 
commit. This will permit extra loans annually of € 10 billion for 2012 and € 35 billion for 2013, going 
down to €25 billion annually for 2014-2015. The second source stems from the use of EU-budgetary 
means for risk buffers to finance infrastructure projects (project bonds) as well as projects to pro-
mote innovation. Devoting annually €5 billion from the budget to risk buffers facilitates additional 
€10 billion in EIB loans per year. We are assuming a four year initiative with respect to the financing 
of risk buffers 
 
Adding the different measures together, the proposed growth impulse (summarized in Table 1 and 
Figure 2 below) consists of: 
- In 2012 €15 billion of activities funded by the EU-budget (structural funds rededicated) as 
well as €20 billion of extra EIB loan activity (10 billion financed by EU-budgetary means for 
risk buffers, €10 billion financed by the capital increase); this implies altogether €35 billion 
for 2012. 
- In 2013, €15 billion funded by EU budget (again rededicated structural funds) as well as €45 
billion of extra EIB loan activity (€ 10 billion financed by EU budget for risk buffers, €35 billion 
financed by capital increase). This implies all together € 60 billion. 
- In 2014 and 2015, €25 billion of activities funded by the EU-budget and €35 billion in annual 
EIB loans (again €10 billion by budgetary means for risk mitigation, and €25 billion of extra 
loans supported by the capital increase); this totals €60 billion per year. 
- Thus over the 2013-2015 period, we have an average of €60 billion a year additional EIB lend-
ing and EU budget injections to finance extra investment and working capital; this corre-
sponds to about 0.5% of EU annual GDP. As discussed below, this could have a major impact 
on EU growth and employment. 
- From 2016 to 2020, there would be continued €25 billion of additional activities funded by 
the EU budget.  
-  
 
Table 1: Additional proposed EIB and EU growth expenditure programme (in billion Euros) 
       2012 2013 2014-2015 (annual) 2016-2020 (annual) 
Additional EU budget 15 15 25                25 
Additional EIB lending total 20 45 35   
 -- Risk buffers 10 10 10   
 -- Capital increase 10 35 25   
    
  
  







It is both feasible and important to set-up as soon as possible a reliable investment program of this 
size, in order to foster a credible, sustainable growth impulse that carries Europe forward.  
 
Though slightly smaller, with a total dimension of about 2% of GDP, but with quite important front-
loading, this current plan could -like the Marshall Plan- contribute to a significant renewal of growth 
dynamic in Europe. 
 
 
9. Investment multiplier of the program for growth 
 
 
The advantage of the outlined program for growth also lies in the fact that it attracts other financing 
partners, notably from the private sector. So an additional leverage or multiplier effect is created. 
 
The most evident multiplier can be found in the risk buffered activities of the EIB related to project 
bonds, where the explicit purpose is to bring private finance to work for infrastructure projects. The 
multiplier for this product is four. The promoter brings in some 25 % on equity, EIB with the budget 
support of EC money provides the next risky 25 % as a kind of very junior or mezzanine loan and in 
addition EIB commits itself to an originate and hold strategy. The private investors are invited to 
come in with 50 % of the financing as a senior loan (or in the form of project bonds). The resulting 
multiplier is four looked at from the view of the EIB lending. The resulting multiplier is eight looked 
from the view of the EU budget.  The multiplier for the risk buffer for innovation can be calculated in 
the following way. As the EIB finances up to 50 % with the regular loans to innovation and in some 
exceptional cases up to 75 % a multiplier of two on average seems appropriate. For the EU budget 
the multiplier is in between four and six for the risk innovation buffer.  These two different products 
are described above together.  
 
The second pillar of the program is the additional EIB lending based on the selective and targeted 

























Figure 2: Additional proposed EIB and EU growth expenditure programme 
(billions of Euros) 
Additional EIB lending total 
Additional EU budget 
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financing partner (or a group of) with the same size of 50 %. This average reflects some rather lower 
participation shares, notably with very big projects such as offshore wind-farms and higher participa-
tion shares where the anti-crisis-component is higher or where the innovative impact requires a 
higher share of EIB than 50 %. So the multiplier is calculated as an average of two. If the additional 
lending of the EIB based on the capital injection is front loaded for the first four years, the respective 
figures are € 95 billion of additional EIB lending for the first four years, resulting in total investment 
of up to € 190 billion. 
 
Besides multipliers achieved by leverage of EIB and co-financing with the private sector, further mul-
tiplying effects can be achieved by the EIB co-financing with increased lending by national develop-
ment banks where these exist; a very successful example is the German KfW. 
 
 
10. Estimating impact: EIB lending and EU expenditure creates 1.2 million jobs in Europe 
 
 
In spite of the fact that the crisis broke out almost 4 years ago, Europe has still not regained its mo-
mentum and the EU is expected to go into recession in 2012 (see Figure 3). Growth prospects for the 
Euro zone are even gloomier. Growth in Europe in 2013 is expected to be in the range of 1 pct. which 
is still below the historical growth rate. These figures could be significantly worse if the crisis deterio-
rates, as looks quite possible at the time of writing. 
 
 
Figure 3. GDP-growth in the EU, 1996-2013 
 
 
Note: *= forecast 
Source: AE on the basis of Eurostat (historical data) and Consensus Economics (forecast data). 
 
The gloomy growth prospects point to a Europe that is  clearly not yet past the crisis. 24 out of 27 EU 
countries are under the EUs Excessive deficit procedure and are recommended to tighten fiscal poli-
cy. This has led the leaders of the EU to focus on restoring balanced budgets in an attempt to “cut-
back” their way out of the crisis. 
 
Recently, the European leaders are starting to realize that economic upturn is far from self-
generating and a coordinated European growth package seems likely to become a reality. The key 
question in this matter is how the growth package should be financed. A consensus is starting to 
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form, viewing an expanded role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and of EU Structural Funds as 
one key of increasing investments in Europe. This view is supported by the European Commissioner 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, Olli Rehn: “With the European Investment Bank, the EU has a 
powerful institution to support growth and employment. But it is reaching the limits of what it can do 
with its current capital base. To allow the EIB to do more for growth and jobs, its capital needs have 
to be addressed.”1. 
 
How big a capital infusion is needed into EIB is the next question. If EIB’s called up capital is doubled 
by € 11.6 billion, and some €5 billion are injected as risk capital into the EIB, as well as additional 
resources are provided from the EU budget (see Table 1 and Figure 2, and detailed discussion above), 
additional resources corresponding to €60 billion or ½ pct. of EU GDP can be made available over the 
next 3 years, due to the benefits of leverage, starting in 2013. An additional resource of € 60 billion 
annually also has been mentioned by a number of European key officials.  
 
In what follows we report the results from model calculations using the international macroeconomic 
model HEIMDAL. The results will illustrate the GDP and employment effects created by a European 
Investment bank expansion in investments and the additional EU contributions like the ones previ-
ously described. A more detailed description of the calculations can be found in Box 1.   
 
 
Box 1. A European investment pact 
In the model calculations it is assumed that the size of EIB lending and EU additional contri-
butions are increased, which is equivalent to ½ percent of EU GDP. It is however uncertain 
how much of the 60 bn. Euro that will go to investments and when. 
 
The model calculations focus on the part of the additional EIB lending and additional EU 
contributions that will go to investment and the calculations shows the effects for the years 
2013 and 2014. 
 
In the following it is assumed  very conservatively that it is half of the additional EIB lending 
and additional EU contributions in 2013 that will go to investment and two thirds of the 
additional EIB lending and additional EU contributions in 2014 that will go to investments. 
This corresponds to an increase in investments in the EU of 1/4 percent of GDP in 2013 and 
1/3 percent of GDP in 2014. 
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the most crisis affected  countries in southern Europe 
(Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece) are more likely to use the new EIB and EU funds, as priori-
ty would be given to lending to them for economically viable investment and working capital 
of SMEs, as well as making EU budget transfers . Concretely, it is assumed that these coun-
tries increase investments twice as much as the remaining countries (measured in percent 
of GDP). 
 
The calculations are based on increased borrowing as previously described, corresponding to an in-
crease in investments in the EU of 1/4 percent of GDP in 2013 and 1/3 percent of GDP in 2014. If 
effects in 2012 and 2015 were included the accumulated impact on growth and employment would 
be even higher. If the contributions from increased lending by the private sector were further includ-
                                                          




ed, the impact would also be higher. It is assumed in the calculations that primarily the southern 
European countries will benefit from the increase in investments. 
 
Figure 4 shows the estimates of the effects on the European GDP-level with the investment pact,-
that is the additional resources. It is shown how the investment pact increases GDP. In 2013 GDP 
growth   increases by 0.36 percentage points, meaning that if GDP is expected to grow by just above 
1 percent without the investment pact GDP, it  will grow by close to 1.5 percent if the investment 
pact is realized.  
 
By 2014 overall GDP in the EU has accumulated an increase of almost 0.6 percent due to the invest-
ment pact. The additional effect on GDP growth in 2014 corresponds to an increase of 0.2 percent. 
 
Figure 4. Accumulated effects on the European GDP-level with the investment pact 
 
 
Source: ECLM on the basis of the international macroeconomic model HEIMDAL. 
 
The calculations on the model show that the pact will create at least 1.2 million jobs towards 2014 on 
an EU level. In figure 5 it is shown how more than ½ a million jobs are created already in 2013, in-







































Table 2 below reports the accumulated GDP and employment effects in a number of European coun-
tries by 2014. The investments will increase GDP in the range of 0.3-0.8 percent, depending on coun-
try specific multipliers and investment shares. Naturally, we observe the largest effects in southern 
European countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece where the investment shares are increased 
the most. 
 
However, an open country such as Germany will also benefit highly from the coordinated investment 
pact, due to the fact that Germany is a very export orientated economy that will benefit highly from 
the increased inter-country trade. The largest spill-over effects and benefits from a coordinated pact 
will therefore be seen in small countries or countries that depend highly on trading with other Euro-
pean countries. 
 
































Table 2: Effects of Investment Pact on GDP and employment 
 
 
GDP effect Employment effect 
 
(Percent) (1.000 pers.) (Percent) 
Germany 0.63 278 0.67 
Poland 0.50 72 0.44 
Finland 0.53 11 0.46 
Denmark 0.55 14 0.51 
Sweden 0.43 17 0.35 
Great Britain  0.45 102 0.35 
France 0.33 99 0.38 
Southern European countries with increased investment shares 
Spain  0.71 135 0.75 
Portugal 0.81 40 0.86 
Greece 0.62 26 0.65 
Italy 0.46 121 0.52 
    EU-27 0.56 1,241 0.57 
Source: ECLM on the basis of the international macroeconomic model HEIMDAL. 
 
The effects of an investment package on European economies are particularly large because the 
countries are highly integrated. Figure 6 illustrates an example comparing where Spain increases 
investment by itself only and together with other European countries. 
 
The figure shows why cooperation is so important. In the figure for Spain the total job creation with 
an investment pact is divided into the effect stemming from domestically created jobs and the effect 
stemming from increased trade with other European countries. Out of a total of 135,000 jobs creat-
ed, 64,000 of them stem from increased trade. Put differently, the positive trade effects account for 
50 percent of the jobs created. 
 
Figure 6. Job creation in Spain decomposed into domestic and trade effect 
 












Alone (Domestic effect) Coordinated (trade effect)
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Looking forward, the challenges facing Europe are not only to curb the debt crisis, but just as im-
portantly to create growth and jobs. Indeed, by supporting growth, such measures will help ease the 
sovereign debt crisis. Hopefully, the fiscal pact can create some confidence, but it is of great im-
portance that the coordination of policy is stretched further by stimulating growth and employment. 
An investment pact as described can help catalyze an economic upturn in Europe. 
 
In the figures above only the direct effects from increased investments are pictured. It is very likely 
that the investment pact will increase consumer and investor confidence in the private sector. It is 
also likely that the investment pact could help lower spreads on sovereign debt in southern Europe, 
especially if aided by a more active effort from the European Central Bank. 
 
Increased investment can additionally have important supply side effects in the future on EU’s com-
petitiveness and ability to grow in the long term. If confidence is increased and interest rates de-
creased as a result of the investment pact, then the positive effects on growth and employment will 
be even larger. 
 
 
11. Further effects of stabilization and creation of jobs by financing of working- capital   
 
 
Above we have reported estimates from modeling effects on increased investment. .The SME related 
parts of the program will further   both stabilize jobs and partly create new ones. The main effect on 
SMEs comes with building and re-building the access to finance for those who have to pre-finance 
supplies. If no access to finance is available, the respective companies have to reduce staff or to re-
duce their growth path. In several countries of the EU - including Portugal, Italy, Greece, Ireland and 
Spain - the access to finance is at least partly blocked.  
 
With this typical anti-crisis component a job could be kept (or be created) for one year with a loan of  
€40000 of a loan, of which half would be provided by a commercial bank, as EIB loans are co-
financed. If the part of the EIB financing not spent in investments , went to SME credit(as has done in 
the past), this  will keep  or create an additional  large number of jobs in the EU 27 with greater  focus 
on the countries heavily hit by the crisis. 
